To fix the DL...

[Bootleg11]

Should Nebraska be combing NFL practice squads for DT/DE that have never actually played in the NFL and never graduated college?

That's what college basketball is turning into.

I hate it, I absolutely hate it. And the AD's, NCAA, coaches, player's "agents" and players all share some blame. It's turned me into less of a fan of college football.

But if that's the way of the world until they admit that these are actual employees and contracts and rules can be enforced, why wouldn't Nebraska do this?

 

[Baron Winnebago]

I'd guess they're blanket ineligible because practice squad contracts are NFL deals.

 

[jaihawk]

I'd guess they're blanket ineligible because practice squad contracts are NFL deals.

I'd be curious how the G League contracts are laid out. I was reading the other day about a guy that plays for a G League team (he's obviously getting paid), but has been rejecting a 2-way contract because he wanted to leave the door open to go back to college. Seems crazy to me.

 

[2010sarenevercomingback]

I'd guess they're blanket ineligible because practice squad contracts are NFL deals.

You'd probably have to be willing to go to court about it. They'd appear to be technically ineligible, but courts have mostly undercut the NCAA's ability to enforce that.

 

[Baron Winnebago]

You'd probably have to be willing to go to court about it. They'd appear to be technically ineligible, but courts have mostly undercut the NCAA's ability to enforce that.

It's definitely possible a court would rule that way, but I'd guess the NCAA would dig in harder to fight it.

 

[Baron Winnebago]

I'd be curious how the G League contracts are laid out. I was reading the other day about a guy that plays for a G League team (he's obviously getting paid), but has been rejecting a 2-way contract because he wanted to leave the door open to go back to college. Seems crazy to me.

I know Dink Pate (which is the guy you are talking about apparently) who went to G League Ignite is trying to get back into college and I'm a bit more sympathetic in those cases because he never played college ball. There are a bunch of dudes in NCAA hoops who played "professionally" in Europe before coming to college and that's been accepted for years.

But as far as I'm concerned, once you play college and decide to leave, the book should be shut on that

 

[Bootleg11]

But as far as I'm concerned, once you play college and decide to leave, the book should be shut on that

I agree, I despise what this has all become.

 

[Kaladin]

Everyone is trying to get old and stay old

 

[ThankGODforWVB]

There is this quiet issue out there for the NCAA that involves the notional idea that D1 football, basketball and some other sports are amateur athletics and not a professional sport. This concept of it being an amateur sport, is important to insure that the Sherman Anti-trust Act can't be used to litigate issues in NCAA sports.

The NCAA would like to have Congress legislate a cut-out for the NCAA regarding this so that contracts with players can be resolved more precisely, but until that happens, Universities and the NCAA are going to be a bit reticent about this issue.

 

[Carm]

There is this quiet issue out there for the NCAA that involves the notional idea that D1 football, basketball and some other sports are amateur athletics and not a professional sport. This concept of it being an amateur sport, is important to insure that the Sherman Anti-trust Act can't be used to litigate issues in NCAA sports.

The NCAA would like to have Congress legislate a cut-out for the NCAA regarding this so that contracts with players can be resolved more precisely, but until that happens, Universities and the NCAA are going to be a bit reticent about this issue.

the Supreme Court already held in Alston back in 2021 that Sherman applied to college sports. This is the Supreme Court's summary of the lower court findings about NCAA "amateurism" :

In applying the rule of reason, the district court began by observing that the NCAA enjoys “near complete dominance of, and exercise monopsony power in, the relevant market”—which it defined as the market for “athletic services in men’s and women’s Division I basketball and FBS football, wherein each class member participates in his or her sport-specific market.” D. Ct. Op., at 1097. The “most talented athletes are concentrated” in the “markets for Division I basketball and FBS football.” Id., at 1067. There are no “viable substitutes,” as the “NCAA’s Division I essentially is the relevant market for elite college football and basketball.” Id., at 1067, 1070. In short, the NCAA and its member schools have the “power to restrain student-athlete compensation in any way and at any time they wish, without any meaningful risk of diminishing their market dominance.” Id., at 1070.

The district court then proceeded to find that the NCAA’s compensation limits “produce significant anticompetitive effects in the relevant market.” Id., at 1067. Though member schools compete fiercely in recruiting student-athletes, the NCAA uses its monopsony power to “cap artificially the compensation offered to recruits.” Id., at 1097. In a market without the challenged restraints, the district court found, “competition among schools would increase in terms of the compensation they would offer to recruits, and student- athlete compensation would be higher as a result.” Id., at 1068. “Student-athletes would receive offers that would more closely match the value of their athletic services.” Ibid. And notably, the court observed, the NCAA “did not meaningfully dispute” any of this evidence. Id., at 1067; see also Tr. of Oral Arg. 31 (“[T]here’s no dispute that the—the no-pay-for-play rule imposes a significant restraint on a relevant antitrust market”).

The district court next considered the NCAA’s procompetitive justifications for its restraints. The NCAA suggested that its restrictions help increase output in college sports and maintain a competitive balance among teams. But the district court rejected those justifications, D. Ct. Op., at 1070, n. 12, and the NCAA does not pursue them here. The NCAA’s only remaining defense was that its rules preserve amateurism, which in turn widens consumer choice by providing a unique product—amateur college sports as distinct from professional sports. Admittedly, this asserted benefit accrues to consumers in the NCAA’s seller-side consumer market rather than to student-athletes whose compensation the NCAA fixes in its buyer-side labor market. But, the NCAA argued, the district court needed to assess its restraints in the labor market in light of their procompetitive benefits in the consumer market—and the district court agreed to do so. Id., at 1098.

Turning to that task, the court observed that the NCAA’s conception of amateurism has changed steadily over the years. See id., at 1063–1064, 1072–1073; see also supra, at 3–7. The court noted that the NCAA “nowhere define the nature of the amateurism they claim consumers insist upon.” D. Ct. Op., at 1070. And, given all this, the court struggled to ascertain for itself “any coherent definition” of the term, id., at 1074, noting the testimony of a former SEC commissioner that he’s “ ‘never been clear on . . . what is really meant by amateurism.’ ” Id., at 1070–1071.